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ECONOMIC DECISION MAKING IN A PUBLIC MARKETPLACE

Stuart Plattner
Center for International Studies
University of Missouri-St. Louis
Observers have often noted that public marketplaces are the nearest thing in
reality to the Economic model of pure competition (Belshaw 1965, Geertz 1979). 1
Here I will discuss the implications of this similarity for the economic deci~ion
The discussion will be grounded in
ethnographic and statistical data from Soulard; Market, St.· Louis, Missouri. 2

making of vendors in such markets.

Soulard Market is an urban, municipal marketplace similar in many ways to urban
marketplaces in developing nations.

However it is a functio;ia1 part of an

· adva~ced and heavily capitalized industrial produce system; I will ask whether a
11

purely competitive marketplace facilitates economically efficient, profit-

maximizing behavior. My principal conclusion wi 11 be that vendors do not extract
the highest possible profit in the short run, even though the marketplace makes
this relatively easy for them.
niche on the marketplace.

They seem more concerned to maintain a long run

Many others have shown that economic actors in

agrarian systems often trade off profit for security (Cancian 1979, Johnson 1977,
Lipton 1968).

This study is significant because it uses quantitative data to

reveal the strength ·of custom in an economic structure .designed for high
efficiency, within modern United States society.
Economic Decision Making in a Purely Co~petitive Market
A market in which buyers and sellers can enter without bias, no one of whom
acts on so· 1arge a scale that his activities can determine prices; \vhere
participants act on economic rather than on kinship, political, or other grounds;
and where knowledge about supply, demand, price, and quality is feely avai lab1e
is said to be purely competitive (Mansfield 1970). ·· In such a market, actors

2

compete on the basis of price and value alone.

If one vendor (including

producers who sell their products) makes extraordinary prof its other vendors
know it and are free to shift their activities to take advantage of the causes of
those profits. If one seller offers better terms, service, or a better 11 product 11
in any significant 11ay, buyers know it and are free to shift thei.r purchases to
1

take advantage of that offer.

Over time less efficient vendors will find them-

selves without customers and will drop out of the market.

Thus, this theory

predicts that a purely competitive market will tend to be composed of relatively
efficient firms, due to the actions of free competition (Winter 19.71).
Public marketplaces approximate these conditions.

Firms tend to be

atomistic, products as standardized as a wide assortment of mass-produced fresh
produce can be, and the flow of knowledge between vendors and buyers is maximally

..

free and efficient. The main difference concerns entry to the market. In theory
stalls could be let every year to the highest. bidder with no considerijtion of
history on the market.

In fact some sorts of vendors are usually preferred and

others forbidden (at Soulard, farmers are preferred and non-food sellers cannot
rent on an annual basis); the _rent is usually fixed at a low rate; and factors
like traditional tenure on the market and political influence count for much in
the allocation of scarce, valuably-located stalls. Thus the marketplace studied
here is much like, but not identical to, a purely competitive market.
The theoretical tendency towards efficiency in urban public marketplaces is
reinforced where vendors are merchants, not primary producers.

Such merchants

buy on a wholesale market what they resell at 'the retail market.

A retail

produce marketplace is like a real-world learning machine for teaching efficient
economic decision making.
A merchant 3 in such a market selects a produce
profile, meaning an assortment of different items in various quantities, and
offers it for sale.

At the end of the market day the merchant is left with cash

3
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and produce.

Some of the produce will hold up until the next market day and some

will not. Were too many plums bought? They didn't hold up in the summer heat and
lie rotting on the ground. Were not enough potatoes on hand? Customers had to be
refused.

The decision maker compares his gross sales revenues with his costs

(including the whole sale cost of the produce, wages paid to helpers, rent,
selling materials such as bags, etc).

What is left is the family income for that

When contemplating plums and potatoes in the wholesale market, the

week.

previous week's experience is fresh in the decision maker's memory, including the
rotting fruit and the additions or withdrawals from the family savings.

In

principle, such a rapid, frequent, and concrete response to decisions should
guide one towards maximally efficient decision making, given reasonably steady
boundary conditions and constraints.
Thus I can state the

11

economic 11 hypothesis of this paper:

A public

marketplace, insofar·-as it allows free atomistic competition between a regular
set of firms, should tend to be composed of firms that are Maximally Efficient in
the Short Run (MESR).
On the other hand, making decisions is not easy.

It requires energy and

discipline, items which are not always in plentiful supply.

The long-:-run ·

strategy of many learning systems is to internalize decisions, or to habitualize
them, so that the organism or system can free its energy for other concerns
(Bateson 1963).

Thus systems theory predicts that decision-makers will tend to

traditionalize their decisions.
There are also economic rewards for less-variable or traditionalized
behavior.

One's occupation should produce a long-run, not just a short-run

income. Workers in an informal economy, without the benefits of insurance, sickleave, etc., have to be concerned about the effects of losses on their lifestyle.

If saving is difficult, it is reasonable to sacrifice some proportion of

4

one 1 s long-run average income for some stability in one 1 s short-run cash income.
In a market the way to do this is through economic custom.

Customers tie

themselves to a firm because they know they will find their customary goods
there.

This solves the consumer s decision-making problem and gives the vendor
1

an expectation of stability.
And finally, the real marketplace is not as simple as the model of pure
competition.

Firms are related to each other through kinship and friendship,

which ameliorates competition.
the marketplace.

This can help maintain a less efficient firm on

Thus the alternative,

11

cultural -economic 11 hypothesis can be

stated:
The realities of life on a marketplace will let customary, or traditionalized decision makers endure.
Soulard Market
These hypotheses will be tested against data from a study of Soulard Farmers
Market, St. Louis, Missouri.
teenth century.

The marketplace has existed since the early nine-

It is located in a mixed industrial, decayed-and-renewing-

housing neighborhood of St. Louis City comparable to Detroit s Eastern market
1

(DeWeese 1975).

During the summer about ninety firms, who rent most of the 272

stalls on an annual basis, fill the market on Fridays and Saturdays selling fresh
produce and other foods.

An additional twenty or so firms rent stalls on a daily

basis and sell non-food items.

During the winter most of the farmers drop out

and a small number of merchants continue to sell shipped-in produce to the hardy
regular patrons of the market.
The history of Soulard Farmers Market has been dealt with in other publications (Eckstein and Plattner 1978; Byrne and Plattner 1980). The important fact
to keep in mind is that the typical vendor is from a family that has been on the
market 50 years or three generations or more.

"

Most merchants have relatives in

5

other Soulard Market firms, and many have relatives in the St. Louis wholesale
produce market.
of saying,

11

Selling at the market is a way of life, or, as vendors are fond

You grow up in it and it gets in your blood 11 •

An institutional analysis of the market has also been published (Plattner
1978).

In brief, public marketplaces such as Soulard allow wholesale produce

distributors to finesse their business by providing a disposition for lots of
produce too small to be used by chain stores. They also allow wholesale produce
jobbers to dispose of m~stakes, fallouts, and below-grade produce.

Merchants at

Soulard specialize in using their low-paid, usually family labor to process and
sell produce that supermarkets, with union-scale produce clerks, simply cannot
afford to deal in. Thus, public urban marketplaces function as 11 shock-absorbers 11
for the modern vertically-integrated, mass-distribution produce economy.
Soulard is also an anachronistic, picturesque reminder of pleasant days
gone by, 1t1hen shoppers had the ski 11 s to di st ingui sh good produce from bad, knew
how to make use of both types, and if ever offered a processed plastic-wrapped
chicken would have asked suspiciously,

11

What did this bird die of?"

A typical Soulard merchant starts his week on Wednesday evening at the
wholesale market, located in St Louis City about three miles from Soulard.

This

market, called Produce Row, contains about thirty-five jobbing firms who dispose
of bulk shipments in relatively small lots; and a smaller number of brokers, who
handle large-scale orders and do not physically possess the goods.

Not too many

years ago most of the fresh produce consumed in the United States passed through
produce markets such as Produce Row (Kohls and Uhl 1980 ch. 1, Breimyer 1976).
The major trend of the past quarter century, however, has been towards vertical
integration of ever larger supermarket companies with huge corporate farms in the
main

growing

areas

of

California,

Florida,

and

the

Southwest.

Chain-

Supermarkets operate their own distribution and 1t1arehousing net•,vorks and shop
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the wholesale markets as little as possible, usually for specialty items and
emergency situations.
having stronger local

However St. Louis is

11

behind 11 the rest of the country in

chains and many independent supermarkets who

small

patronize the wholesale market.

After these firms have placed their orders for

hundreds or thousands of cases of produce with the jobber's salesmen, the latter
bargain with Soulard merchants over a price for their tens of cases.

Since this

takes place at the end of the wholesale selling week, the impact of Soulard s
1

total volume can be significant.

If Soulard s merchants did not clean out by
1

purchase the coldstorage lockers of the jobbing firms, the wholesalers would have
to clean out the lockers at a loss, increasing the cost of doing business for
everyone concerned.
Thus the Soulard merchants check the supply (wholesale availability and
prices) of the week's produce relatively early in the week.

They return to

Produce Row late Thursday evening and shop the wholesale market until early
Friday morning. This is the time when their important weekly decisions are made:
what, and how much, to stock.

By 6:00 A.M. Friday the merchant~ try to arrive at

Soulard to begin setting up neat displays of produce.

Friday is a slow selling

day, whose main function is to allow a leisurely set-up and a preliminary
appreciation of the market week's business.

Early Saturday morning, after

dashing to the wholesale market for extra cases of items that were unexpected
good sellers, the main selling day begins.

By 8:00 A.M. vendors have fully set

up, made a first round of the market to check upon their competitors' prices, and
set their standard prices for the bulk of their sales.

Until 2:00 P.M. Soulard

is the familiar exciting bedlam of a successful retail marketplace.

Most of the

shoppers are drawn from the local metropolitan area, more than half are Black,
and very few are middle-or upper-class in appearance.

Thus fourth generation

German-American farmers who speak English with a Germanic intonation sell
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collard, mustard and turnip greens to Black homemakers who have shopped at their
families' stand for years.

After 2:00 P.M. a first round of price decreases is

made as vendors take stock and plan the end of the day.

By 5:00 P.M. market

stragglers can find incredible bargains, as Soulard merchants try to clean up
their stock in the same way that Produce Row jobbers cleaned up the same produce
at wholesale.

Sy 7:00 P.M. the day is over.

A merchant thus faces a well-defined decision problem:
profile of produce that will yield a healthy income.

He must select a

In principle, the niche

(the customary set of items offered for sale, independent of quantity) of a
profit-maximizing merchant could vary with slight changes in the weekly economic
climate to take advantage of variations in costs.

If the cost-price ratio of

tangerines or collard greens becomes more profitable, any vendor should be able
to stock them.

All produce is basically similar, being a live organism which

began dying the moment it was harvested.

One who has "grown up

11

in the market-

place should have enough general knowledge to handle any type of fresh produce.
Yet niches vary only gradually, in adjustment to seasonal changes and in long-run
interaction with a number of crucial constraints. These constraints include the
specific attributes of various types of produce, the quality and quantity of
labor a merchant can count upon, the competition offered by neighboring firms,
and the number of stalls one can use regularly.

Like most major occupational

choices decisions to change one's niche are made gradually, over the long run,
and are simply not examined each week.

The weekly decision problem focuses on
the quantities of regular items one customarily sells. 4
The relevant concepts are "slots" and items 11 , which can be top-of-the11

11

stand11, "shelf", and "staple" items.A 11 slot 11 refers to an area of stall that
ordinarily contains one item.

Most vendors stack produce upon 24-inch square

plastic trays (originally used by bakery deliverymen to carry breads and
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pastries). These trays fit neatly four across the surface of a market stall, and
define the normal minimal display area for a

11

top-of-the-stand 11 item.

These

items normally provide the fundamental part of the week s income.
1

Most stalls also have a waist-high shelf in front, along the customer aisle,
upon which non-bruising "shelfll items such as carrots, celery, cucumber, green
peppers, and radishes, are placed for customers to select.
"Staples" refer to regularly stocked items. Thus a slot is normally filled
with a staple, both on top of the stand and on the shelf.
define one 1 s niche.

Slots and staples

The staple produce which accounts for the main part of the

merchant's income normally passes from the storage truck, parked behind the
stand, to the slots on top of the stand where it is stacked for display, and
across the stand into the customers shopping bag.
Each item of produce has a unique set of labo~requirements. Citrus fruits,
melons~ pre-packaged carrots and radishes and similar items require none but the
simple ability to count correctly, bag items rapidly, and make change rapidly. 5
Produce sold by weight requires an ability to rapidly and accurately select the
correct number of items for a desired weight.

If high weight is given, the

merchant s income is being dissipated; if low weight, the merchant risks a heated
1

complaint from the customer, backed up with evidence from the official scale in
the market master s office.
1

If a worker spends too much time fiddling around to

get the weight exactly right, the merchant loses sales from other customers who
get tired of waiting when other stands near by offer the same products.
Trimming is an important constraint for some produce.

Wrapper leaves on

lettuce and cabbage must be trimmed so that the head looks clean, yet is not
reduced into a smaller price category.
extremely labor intensive.

Corn, if sold husked and trimmed, is

A box of 54 ears can take 30 minutes to trim.

Soft

tomatoes, hard potatoes, all must be weighed and bagged, total bills calculated,

9

change made, all without error at top speed with a pleasant smile.

Hence the

quantity and quality of labor available is a primary constraint upon a merchant's
niche.

One can hire non-relatives, and many do, but the probability is high that

the worker will pocket some of the cash flowing constantly through his or her
fingers.

Some non-related workers circle the market during the year, hired for a

few weeks by firms with desperate needs for workers, and fired for stealing after
a while.

If one does not have teenaged children or other close relatives, it is

difficult to specialize in items which require much labor to trim and sell.

The

minimal niche in terms of labor requirements consists of citrus fruits and
seasonal fruits such as peaches, nectarines and cherries.
The competition offered by neighboring firms also determines a firm's
niche.

A merchant cannot compete directly with a farmer in locally grown items,

because of the general consumer preference for "home-grown

II

i terns.

Thus mer-

chants with stalls next to successful farmers cannot hope to specialize in
greens, squash, beans, or other local produce.

If a neighboring firm spe-

cializes, as a few do,in selling very low-grade produce ("real junk 11 or

11

slop 11 )

then one's sales of those same items at 11 normal 11 prices i'lill suffer. In general,
people inherit their niches as many have inherited their stalls, from fathers and
uncles.

Vendors grew up dealing in well-defined sets of produce, and have

awesome amounts of knOl'lledge about qualities of items in different seasons from
various shipping points.

This ranges from general guidelines ( 11 Arizona lettuce

ain't -riorth a damn 11 ) to more particular rules of thumb C1 this time of year,
peaches out of Georgia have this shriveled-up pit with a kind of mold that looks
bad. It's a good-tasting peach but people don t like the way that looks and they
1

don't buy it again"), to specific brand names ( King-of-the-~/est ships the best
11

damn honeydews you can get").

It is possible that the dangers of selecting

unsaleable produce at the wholesale market (in the middle of the night when one

10

is tired, with pressure from the wholesale jobber salesmen to make a quick
decision), increase dramatically as one deals in unfamiliar produce.

For all

these reasons the economic niche occupied by each merchant does not vary in the
short run.

The essential income-producing decisions made by each vendor have to

do with the quantity of each item in their regular inventory.
A Descriptive Decision Model
With these constraints in mind, the descriptive model of decision making by
Soulard market merchants in Figure 1 can be examined.

This model should be-

thought of as my hypothesis, based on intensive interviews and participant
observation at Produce Row and at Soulard Market, of how merchants make their
stock decisions.

It will be the subject of a later paper, and ii given here as a

brief comparison to the economic regression model that 1tlill follow.
The model in Figure 1 should be read as a standard flowchart, from top to
bottom and left to right fol lowing the arrows.

Merchants begin each week by

searching the wr1olesale market for information on supply.

The most critical

information concerns special deals, where produce is available for a fraction of
its normal pric,e.

One vendor summed up the importance of investigating the

wholesale market:
It I s like my fat her used to say,

1

you make your money downto"'m, you

make it at Produce Row, not at Soulard.

This means that the demand at the retail market is strong and steady, so that any
reasonably priced produce will sell.

The critical issue, then, is the avail-

ability and cost of the produce at wholesale.

Special deals usually deriv~ from

a breakdown or mistake in the system, as the example shows (this vendor works at
the wholesale market during the week):

11

Now, last week I would never in a blue moon thought that we would sell
strawberries.

In the beginning of the week strawberries were real

strong going for $7.00.
1

At $6.85 to $7.00 (a box) they were real

strong. Where I work ~t we were rationing strawberries out.
put the~ on display because we'd have none to sell.
to buy off us.
sell.

Everybody is trying to buy them.

We didn't

Untted is trying

We aint got none to

I figured that maybe this weekend I would buy maybe six or eight

strawberries, just for steady trade who ask for strawberries.

Sell

them just to get my money back or make a dime or a quarter, I would be
happy.

Then I walk up to work one day, and I get a strong strawberry

smell, and boy, 'who in the hell dropped this pallet of strawberries?

1

,

and I walked over and these guys were unloading a whole load of strawberries.

They got smashed, some of the boxes.

So then I said,

'Halleluja We're going to sell strawberries this week ' Right off the
start I knew I was going to sell strawberries, as soon as I saw that
truck.

The importance of knowing what neighboring vendors will sell is illustrated in
the following statement. This merchant was at Produce Row and saw a pallet load
of tomatoes tagged with the name of a neighboring Soulard merchant who has the
reputation of selling distressed produce:
O.K., I got trouble with tomatoes this t1eek.
1

he got them cheap.

If he got a whole pallet,

I was thinking of selling tomatoes big this week,

but it looks like I'm going to have trouble with them instead.

Each vendor goes over his mental list of seasonally "regular" items, passing
each item through the considerations in the flow chart.

The first concern is

12
whether the item is available at all.

If it is, the regular quantity is adjusted

upward or downward in response to special considerations of demand and supply.
~-

These adjustments are summarized in the Demand-Supply Algorithm.

Basically,

vendors seem to estimate the current week s sales by combining information about

~

1

this week 1 s supply and prices with information about last week 1 s sales.
Then, depending on the strategy usually followed (of specializing in firstquality or distressed-quality produce), the normal quantity of cases is adjusted
by considering the state of competition in special deals.

After that, special

considerations of demand are dealt with, such as whether families will consume
more than usual amounts of food for holidays. The simple rule followed for this
is

11

Whether the kids are home from school. 11
After all regular seasonal items have been considered, the test of comple-

tion is whether the stand s slots are filled.
1

If not, items most similar to

regular items are considered (sweet potatoes can be added to white potatoes,
white onions to yellow, varieties or sizes of citrus fruits added to basic
oranges and grapefruits, etc.).

Each item must pass all four of the criteria in

this section of the flow chart in order to be put on the stand.

If this does not

fill the stand, a worker must be left at home or a regular item spread thin.
Vendors rarely use this part of the decision plan, as they do not often have
trouble filling their stands with regular items. Problems occur between seasons,
when a new producing area has not yet shipped enough volume to cover the decline
in shipments from an area going out of season.
This model may seem too complex to represent the decision process of plain
folks at the marketplace. It is complex, yet still omits consideration of an
enormous amount of knowledge pertaining to qualities of produce at various
=

seasons from various shipping areas.

The ability to assess the quality of an

entire shipment of produce by opening no more than two or three boxes is impres-

;;
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sive, and possessed by most (but not all) merchants.

The criteria used in the

model in Figure 1 are simple and obvious to those familiar 1vith produce markets.
The sales of produce last week were directly experienced, as well as discussed
with friends and neighbors.

Likewise information about the the state of the

wholesale market in the present week is freely available.
11

As Soulard merchants

shop the street" at Produce Row they meet other Soulard vendors and talk shop,

and receive news from wholesale salespeople.

As one merchant put it:

On Wednesday night I hear, from the people's mouths, 'Hey, I got a deal
on grapefruit . . . I bought 30 or 40 boxes.

Another guy says, 'Hey, I

bought them too, I got them a little bit cheaper'.
fifty cents (a box) cheaper.

Maybe he got them

We just do the talking, and, you figure

into your brain, 'Hey, you guys got them, and 1._ got to be with them'
(in selling price).

Many merchants use the wholesale market as a men's club, a place to "hang around"
where the predominantly male participants have known each other for their entire
lives. The comradeship between Soulard merchants and their friends and relatives
at Produce Row is, in fact, very warm and pleasant. 6 As one vendor put it: "When
I wake up in the middle of the night, where else can I go to bum around?"
The important attributes of this model of decision making are that decisions
are simplified and routinized. This explains the common reply of vendors when I
told them I wanted to study their economic decision making:
"It's all supply and demand, there's no decisions in it."
"There's nothing to decide, I just buy my regular items."

Or, more succinctly,
"I can't tell you how I do it, I just do it. 11

14
Vendors were not evading a difficult issue, as I thought at the time. They
were truthfully telling me that, so far as they were concerned, there were no
significant decisions to be made every week.

The important decisions were made

in the long run, concerned one 1 s niche, and were
11

decided. 11

11

grown into 11 more than

In the short run the mi nor adjustments to the number of cases

regularly stocked were simply too routine to merit discussion in their minds.
This is consistent with the work of N. Quinn (1971), C. Gladwin (1976, 1979) and
H. Glad\<tin (1975), who have stressed for years the importance of simplifying
procedures in natural dee is ion making.

Thus the most important lesson to be

drawn from this descriptive model is that the important decisions are not made
each week,
information.

even

though the market structure provides

all

the necessary

I will return to this point after a somewhat different model of

economic decision making at Soulard Market is examined.
A Normative Economic Decision Model
The descriptive mode 1 showed that firms tinkered with their traditional
pattern of choices each week, but the analysis did not evaluate their decisions.
The normative model which follows will ask whether firms are allocating their
resources efficiently.
Merchant firms are in business to make a living, which is represented here
by their net or disposable income.

This income derives from their Gross Sales,
meaning the quantity of produce sold times its price. 7 In the most abstract
sense a vendor s sales are determined by the state of demand, the price of the
1

goods, and the quantity of capital possessed by the firm.

In the marketplace the

demand for produce can be analyzed as an aggregate total market demand, and as a
proportion of this total capturable by any one firm. The aggregate demand varies
by season, yet is strongly regular in the short run.

The demand for the produce

sold by any particular firm is thus affected by factors controllable by the firm

15
(the quantity of selling space or market stalls used and the location of these
stalls within the market wings; the number and quality of workers used to attend
to the sales; the profile of produce on the stalls; and the price level of the
produce), and by factors not controlled by each firm (the season, the existence
of holidays which stimulate demand; the wholesale cost of the produce).

Given

the total demand for market produce in any one week, each firm can capture more
or less of this demand through a productive allocation of the resources it
controls. Thus in the short run of each market week, and from the perspective of
each individual firm, Gross Sales are determined by the allocation of controllable resources, the technical relation between outputs (sales) and inputs, and
by other

11

exogenous 11 forces such as the season of the year.

Merchants use their resources to hire workers and stalls, who in turn create
sales. These are economic variables since they can be hired and have costs which
can be related to their productivity.

Firms also control other factors which

determine sales but are not hired or purchased. The number of items selected to
be sold from the stand, Nitems (as distinc~ from the quantity of produce bought
for resale) affects sales, as does the average standardized price score for the
firm's selling prices, Price, to be explained below.

Another factor affecting

sales is the firm's location in the market, Wing, refering to which of the four
market wings the firm is located in. Wing is fixed in the long run of the market
year, while the other variables can change each market week.

Nitems, Price, and

Wing are strategic variables, which are controlled by the merchants but without
cost, and therefore with economically meaningless marginal products.
A third category of independent variable contains "background" or exogenous
variables which affect sales but are not influenced

by

vendors.

These include

the season of the year and the temperature during market day, Temp, and the
existence of holidays such as Christmas.

16
Note that capital, one of the main conventional determinants of a firm s
1

sales, is not represented here other than as Stalls and Workers.

Firms buy their

produce on credit and this is simply not lacking within the boundaries of normal
volume.

Thus access to capital or credit is not a limiting factor for market

firms, given the size of their operations.
This seems like a lot of variables.

Systemic analysis requires enough

variables so that the effects of each may be controlled for in order to accurately estimate the effects of the economic and strategic variables.

If

variables that are significantly related to Gross Sales are omitted from the
analysis, the estimates of the independent effects of variations in Workers,
Stalls, and other explanatory variables on Gross Sales will be erroneous.

if the

omitted variables are positively related, our estimates will be high;

if

negatively related, our estimates will be too low.
The data to be analyzed consist of 256 11 firm-weeks, 11 or observations of the
activities of a market firm in one week during 1978-79.

These observations are

of twelve different market firms, which are defined as one or more locations
(contiguous sets of stalls) under the management of a boss.

Most firms have only

one location, but some havs two or more.
My economic model of how firms create an income is as follows:

A firm

creates gross sales by using labor and capital in the form of Workers and Stalls
to sell merchandise bought at wholesale.
control of the decision maker.

These are economic variables under the

An additional worker will sell more goods,

holding the number of stalls constant; and more goods can be sold from an
additional stall, holding workers constant, within•reasonable boundaries. These
variables cost money and create income.

In theory an efficient firm wi 11 use

more Workers and Stalls until the increment to net income produced by each falls
to zero.

If the fourth worker adds $50 to your net income and earns $25 in wages,
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it pays you $25 to hire him.
him.

If he adds $20 and earns $25 you lose $5 by hiring

You may still have a valid reason to do so--he may be a family member whom

you wish to keep off the streets--but your reason will not be economic in the
short run. Thus an economically efficient firm adds factors until the last unit
of each factor adds an amount to gross sales that is no smaller than the total
costs of adding that unit of the factor. 9 On the average, firms use three to four
workers and the same number of stalls.

Means and standard deviations (SD's) for

all variables are given in Table 1.
The strategic variables Nitems (number of distinct items sold) and Price (a
complex measure of the average price level of a firm relative to all other firms)
and Wing (the firm's location in the market) also affect Gross Sales. The number
of items on the stand is a variable controllable by each decision maker in the
short run of every market week.

If the regression variable Nitems has a positive

sign it means that additional items on one's stand, holding other factors
constant, add to gross sales.
ments.

Customers buy more from stands with larger assort-

Many vendors in fact reported that large assortments stimulated sales.

Other vendors said that large displays of the same item (which implies small
assortments) stimulated sales.

The regression coefficient will show which

market truism--size of assortment or size of display stimulates sales--is true
for this sample of data.
The price of an item of produce is its basic attribute in a public market
place composed of competing firms.
compare prices with great ease.

This is because shoppers in such markets can
The selling price set for each item is thus a

strategic variable, adjustable but of course not purchased.

In principle, the

total demand for fresh foods sold, at Soulard Market should be relatively
inelastic (people should buy relatively fixed amounts, meaning that total sales
revenues should increase if prices are raised), since Soulard deals in basic

18

foodstuffs.

Families presumably buy the same quantities of vegetables and fruits

in the face of small changes in prices, especially since the total price level at
Soulard Market is significantly below the supermarket price leve1. 10

However,

because shopping from competing firms at Soulard is so easy, the demand for the
food sold by any particular firm should be elastic (people should but less if
prices are increased and more if prices decrease, so that total sales revenues
should decrease as prices are increased).

Thus the regression coefficient for

Price should be negative if this last point is true.
These issues are complicated by the fact that I could not measure quality
when recording prices of the more than one hundred items of fresh produce offered
for sale.

Thus a higher price may reflect a higher quality item, or it may

reflect a strategic decision for average-quality produce.

I coded all

11

peaches 11

with the same code, lumping extra large, picture-perfect California peaches
together with second-quality local peaches. A vendor could charge a 11 ,low 11 price
for shipped-in peaches that is higher than an

11

expensive" price for local

peaches, or he may just charge a low price relative to others for the same item.
Both strategies may operate for different firms in the same day or for the same
firm on different days.

These complications are serious.

Yet, even given the

problems in interpreting this variable, the potential effects of differences in
price levels across market firms are too interesting to ignore.
The average price of every item of produce sold on the market was calculated
across all firms for each market day.

Each firm s price for each item v-ias
1

converted into a standard deviation unit away from that day s mean market price.
1

Say the mean price of tomatoes was fifty cents, with a standard deviation of ten
cents.

Firm A, selling tomatoes for forty cents, got a score of -1.0; firm B,

selling tomatoes for fifty-five cents, got a score of .5, and so on.
are knmvn as

11

z-scores' 1 •

These units

The z-scores for all items sold by each firm were
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averaged to create an average standardized price score (Price) for each firmweek.

The intuitive meaning of this score is as follows:

a score of O means

that, on the average, a firm s prices are no different that the average market
1

prices for those items of produce; a score of -1 means than, on the average, the
firm s prices were a full standard deviation cheaper than the mean market prices
1

for those items of produce that week; and so on.
A negative regression sign for this variable would mean that demand for the
individual firm s produce was price- or quality-elastic.
1

Higher prices would be

associated with lower gross sales and lower prices with higher sales, either
because of pure price concerns or because customers were responding to differences in quality, or both.

A positive sign could indicate price--or quality

inelasticity, meaning that shoppers tended to buy their customary quantities in
the face of moderate increases and decreases in prices.
The location of a firm on the market is another strategic variable, controllable on an annual basis. There are four wings, each differing somewhat in level
of economic activity.

Peak season sales are highest in wings 2 and 4, medium in

wing 3, and lowest in wing 1. However during the winter months wing 3 is the most
active because it, like wing 1, is enclosed. Rent in wings 1 and 3 is trivially
I

cheaper than rent in wings 2 and 4 ($219 per stall-year and $273 per stall-year,
a difference of a dollar per week). 11
The season of the year has a large affect on sales, since people buy more
produce in the summertime and during holidays.

Thus variables for time and for

Christmas (the most significant holiday week) are necessary.

After trying

numerous different ways of specifying the season in regressions, a simple measure
of the temperature at noon on market days (Temp) proved to work best.
-::

This

measure combines the effects of seasonal variations in demand with the effects of
temperature changes \'iithin seasons.

A positive sign for Temp will mean that
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people buy more produce in warmer seasons, and on warmer days within seasons.
The presence of rain on market days, independent of seasons, was found not to
affect gross sales.

I was never able to get a significant coefficient for a

variable coded 11 P for market days when precipitation was reported and

11

011 for

all other days.
An economic model of short-run economic decision making at a public market
place can be formally specified as fol lows (the symbol

11

f 11 means that the

dependent variable is a function of (determined by) the variables in the parenthesis):
Gross Sales = f

(economic variables (labor, capital),

strategic

variables (price, number of items, location on the market), background
variables (season, holidays))+ error in the model and data.

This model can be specified in a regression equation as follows:
Gross Sales= a+ bl (Workers) +b2(Stalls) +cl(Price) +c2(Nitems)
+ c3(Wings*) + dl(Temp) + d2(Christmas*).

Starred variables are binary, or dummy 11 variables whose values are zero or
11

one.

There are actually four dummy wing variables corresponding to the four

market wings.
11

A firm located on wing 2 would be coded 1 on variable
11

011 on the other wing variables.

to Christmas week has

11

11

\✓ ing2

and

Likewise the set of measurements corresponding

1 coded for Christmas, otherwise this variable is coded
11

11011.

The means and SO's of all variables are given in Table 1.

The average

merchant earns about $1350 in gross sales per week, of which about $800
represents the wholesale cost of the produce.

He must pay a total of $150 each

week for his rent, electricity, bags, City sales taxes and helpers, which leaves
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roughly $400 as his disposable income.

Note that the SD 's are very large, in

particular the SD for income is almost the size of the mean.

Conclusions about

any individual merchant's income made from these figures would be fraught with
error.
The results of the regression of the 256 firm-week observation on this model
are given in Table 2. Before these results are discussed the quality of the data
must be evaluated.
Any analysis of people s income must deal with the problem of data quality.
1

To many persons, the size of their income is as sensitive a topic as the details
of their sexual life.

I have no doubt that our measures are reliable, since they

were refined and used over a sixty-week period a year after the first field work
on the·market began.

It is unlikely that validity is an issue, since the

concepts used are elementary and totally familiar to both informants and field
workers. ·However the question of accuracy is more complex.
Vendors at a public market such as Soulard keep no cash register receipts.
Their incomes are private, known only to themselves and their families.

For

purposes of informant rapport neither I nor my field assistants ever asked about
taxes.

We were massively disinterested in taxes.

When we solicited the help of

vendors we clearly stated that we would keep the information securely confidential.

We asked vendors to tell us how much produce they bought, sold, and dumped

each week.

Selling prices were clearly marked, and buying costs were independ-

ently estimated since we found that few vendors would discuss costs.

About one

in four vendors cooperated with this phase of the project and gave us data about
quantities of produce bought and sold.

We made it clear to each informant that

erroneous data was worse than useless, that we preferred no information over
incorrect information, and therefore they had the responsibility of giving
accurate information if they gave any at all. One merchant gave this data for a
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fev,1 months and then dropped out of the project; a close relative continued;
others never began. Thus everyone who gave data v1as comfortable about it, and I
am confident that the data as given was basically honestly reported.
The main factor which could increase my estimate of income over the true
value is that I calculated gross sales as if all produce were sold for the
11

standard 11 selling price set for the heart of the selling day, bet\-1een 9:00 A.M.

and 2:00 P.M., unless I had specific information to the contrary. When data was
available about quantities sold for lowered late afternoon prices, this was
coded.

Otherwise all quantities were coded as sold for the standard price.

Since merchants commonly lowered their prices in the afternoon it is likely that
some portion of the produce was sold for less than it is coded as being sold for,
thereby raising the estimated gross sales bver the true figure.
Other reasons exist for thinking that my estimate of income may be too low.
I coded the wholesale cost of the produce using three streams of data:

the

weekly U.S.D.A. wholesale produce market report; intensive weekly interviews
about costs with two key merchants, one of whom worked full-time at the wholesale
produce market; and ad hoc information each week from merchants. The coders put
this information together to make a best estimate of the true wholesale cost each
week for each item of produce sold at Soulard.

My estimates are as accurate as a

field worker could get in this situation, but each wholesaler-retailer transaction is unique.
ignorance.

One merchant may pay more than the fair market cost, in

Another may p~y far less than the going cost because he happened to

be the right person in the right place at the right time.

The latter is far more

likely, since special deals are the life-blood of Soulard Market merchants.
These deals t1ere often missed by my data collection procedures.
1

Thus reasons for thinking that my estimates of income are too high and
reasons for thinking they are too low exist.

In all, I am confident that the
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regular procedures we used produced figures that, on the average and in the long
run are fundamentally accurate.
The regression equations in Table 2 are significant and account for about
two-thirds of the variance in Gross Sales, leaving one-third unaccounted for by
the variables in the model.

The first regression (Linear-1) shows that it is

difficult to estimate the independent effects of variations in workers, stalls,
and the number of items (Nitems) on Gross Sale because of multi-collinearity.
Essentially these variables are more highly correlated with each other than they
are with the dependent variable, so that each cannot be held constant, while the
others vary, to assess their independent effects.

(The relevant correlation

coefficients are _given at the bottom of Table 2). Workers is not significant in
this regression, which is bad since the number of workers is one of the most
crucial economic variables decided upon each week by merchants.

Stalls, Nitems,

and Temperature are related nonlinearly to Gross Sales, since the square of each
is significant. The negative signs for the squared variables in conjunction with
positive signs for the corresponding untransformed variables shows decreasing
marginal returns, as is expected.

Wing is not really significant, since only

Wing 2 has an F-ratio significant at the .01 level.

This means that sales are

higher in Wing two but not consistently different in the other wings.
not significant, which is a surprise.

Price is

The equation as a whole accounts for 68%

of the variance in gross sales, which is a relatively good (and statistically
significant as shown by the F-ratio) fit for this sort of unaggregated, crosssectional as well as time-series data.

But this is not a satisfactory model

since Workers and Price are not significant.
The second equation (Linear-2) drops Nitems, which allows ~✓ orkers and
Workers 2 to enter the equation as significant explainers of Gross Saies. This
equation

explains

about two-thirds of the variance and

is

statistically
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significant at the .001 level.

Price is still not in the equation, and it would

be better to allow Nitems into the equation since many vendors mentioned that it
is an important strategic variable.
The fact that the squared variables are significant suggests that a
logarithmic transformation may be more suitable.

Table 3 presents data from

regressions where Gross Sales as well as the nonlinear variables Workers, Stalls,
Nitems and Temp are transformed into natural logarithms.

This equation (Log-1)

fit~ the data well and, is statistically significant, explaining three-quarters
of the variance (R 2=.73), a meaningful improvement over linear equations. No
evidence was found of heteroscedast i city or of non 1i neari ty when p1ots of the
residuals and the independent variable (Ln-Gross Sales) were examined.

Workers,

Stalls, and Nitems are significant and positive, which is what v,1e expect on
general principles. Price is siinificant and positive in this equation, which is
interesting.

Wing is not significant, which means that Wing location is not a

reliable determinant of gross sales once other factors are controlled for.

The

second logarithmic equation (Log-2) drops Nitems to see if the fit improves as it
did in the linear equations. The decrease of R2 to .67 shows this is not the
case.

As expected, when Ni terns drops out, its high corre 1at ion with Workers

causes the latter variable to change drastically in size and significance.
other variables remain roughly the same.

The

Christmas increases strongly, since on

holidays, firms stock their stands very fully.

Part of Gross Sales that is

actually caused by the number of items must now be accounted for by Christmas,
since Nitems is not in the equation.
All in all Log-1 represents the most satisfactory economic model of reality
discussed so far and fits the data best. The best way to interpret this sort of
regression equation is as a predictor of Gross Sales. If we wish to know the best
estimate of Gross Sales obtainable from this sample of data for any particular
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sort of firm or set of variable values, we begin with 2.3 (the constant), add .21
times the logarithm of the number of workers, add .52 times the logarithm of the
number of stalls, add .17 if the firm is in Wing2, subtract .39 if Wing3, or add
.28 if Wing4 (nothing is added if the firm is in Wingl since the constant
contains that value), add .24 times the Price of the firm's produce on that day,
add .47 times the logarithm of the temperature at noon on that market day, and,
if it is Christmas week, add .68.

Converting the resulting number from its

logarithmic form into a natural number we have the best linear unbiased estimate
of the gross sales on that day for that firm.

The corresponding estimate for the

entire sample of data would be made with the mean variable values instead of
.

individual values.

This model will be taken provisionally as a good statistical

estimate of the firms' economic decision making.

Let us see what this means.

Marginal products for workers and stalls can be estimated by summing the
value of Gross Sales at the mean of all the other variables and then calculating
Gross Sales for varying numbers of Workers and Stalls, in turn.

The resulting

marginal products are graphed in Figure 2. The best estimate of the addition to
gross sales attributable to workers, at the mean values of all other variables,
is about $75 (at a value of 3.3 workers, the geometric mean value of this
variable).

The marginal product of a third worker is about $85, and of a fourth

about $65 in gross sales.
selling price.

The average markup over all products is about 40% of

Thus the addition to gross income (gross sales minus cost of

produce) of a third worker is about $35 and of a fourth worker about $25.

Most

vendors preferred not to say what they paid their workers. Based on interviews I
estimate the average cost of hiring a worker at roughly $30. This includes wages
;,

(which actually vary beb1een $10 and $40) and the value of the box of produce
that workers non-resident in the boss's household take home.

So the addition to

the entrepreneur s net or disposable income (gross sales minus all attributable
1

I
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costs) of additional workers is about zero at the mean sample values. This means
that if this model is valid, and on the average, Soulard vendors hire workers in
an economically efficient way, as predicted by the Economic theory of the MESR
profit maximizing firm.

This is significant since Workers is really the only

finely adjustable variable under the control of the vendors. The analysis shows
that the vendors are adjusting their use of this variable to yield the maximum
disposable income.

In this respect the marketplace seems to facilitate, or at
least does not impede, efficient economic decision making by vendors. 12 However

note that most workers are relatives, if not household coresidents of bo·sses.
Thus the worker s income supports the firm s household in the majority of the
1

1

cases {see note 14 for data on this point). The pressure to economize on workers
is less in this instance than it would be if workers were unrelated to bosses.
Seemingly excessive labor payments in the kinship situation could easily be
rationalized as the cost of training ne 1t1 managers, or as

11

insurance to minimize

the chance that the family s children will get into trouble on the streets.
1

The marginal product of stalls, at the mean of all variables, is $180 which
roughly corresponds to $70 in gross income. The cost of a stall in weekly rent is
about $5, which means that extra stalls are incredibly valuable to vendors.

The

potential flaw in this conclusion is that the real price of stalls is not merely
the market rent, but the illegal side payment often made to the old holder of the
stall to 11 help him decidett to give it up.

(See note 11). However the turnover of

stalls is slow and sporadic, most stalls having been in the same hands for years
if not generations.

Additional stalls are very valuable, cheap to rent, and

limited in ~upply in the two wings of the marketplace closest to the municipal
parking lot (wings two and four on the North side of the marketplace). There are
vacancies in the South side wings.
regression coefficients for

~✓ ing,

This difference in value is implied by the
since the coefficients for lrJing2 and ~ling4 are
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positive, ,.,,hile that

,✓ ing3

1

is negative,· and Wingl is contained in constant. Even

though these coefficients are not statistically significant they are in the
direction that ethnographic information suggests they should be.
Adding to the number of items on a stand, while holding the other independent variables in the model constant, increases gross sales by about $6.50 per
item (at the means of all variables).

Consumers come to the marketplace with a

shopping list, seeking a number of items, and not just one or two products.
those other items are on the same stand, they will buy them there.

If

It may also be

true that large displays of particular items stimulate larger sales of those
items, but the one firm of the marketplace who fol lm'-ls that strategy, and who
seems to achieve large gross sales, did not supply quantitative sales data and is
not represented in this sample.

For the firms in this sample assortment

outweighs display in stimulating gross sales.
Price is significant and positive, which means that a higher price level
correlates with higher gross sales when other factors are held constant. Whether
(or how much) this effect is due to differences in quality as represented by.
differences in price, or -..,hether it is merely an association of higher prices
with higher dollar sales is not given in this data.

The behavior of this

variable means that vendors in a public marketplace can charge more than market
price and still have higher gross sales, even though surrounded by competitors
offering similar produce.

If consumers were as price conscious as vendors accuse

them of being this would not be the case.

This variable s coefficient is
1

perfectly consistant with a marketplace where many customers do not price-shop
but rather shop on the basis of custom. A consideration and statistical test of
this proposition will be considered below, after the remaining independent
variables are examined.
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Christmas is highly significant.

The average firm sells over a thousand

dollars of produce more than usual during Christmas week.
The effects of temperature are strong since this variable includes seasonal
effects on sales. The coefficient shows that an increase in the temperature from
57

(the mean temperature for the period of data) to 67

is associated with an

increase of gross sales of $86; at 77 the sales increase by $79 and so on.

The

reason for this is that more fresh produce is avai 1able in warmer seasons and
people demand more.

In summertime children are not in school and so eat more

meals at home, which further increases the household s demand for produce.
1

In summary the statistical analysis of the economic model as previously
specified shows that vendors hire workers in an economically efficient, profitmaximizing way; that they enjoy cheap rent; that large assortments rather than
large displays of small assortment sell more produce; and that higher than
average marketplace prices do not injure a firm s gross sales. This latter point
1

has interesting implications, which will be considered now.
Economic Custom
The analysis so far has assumed that shoppers at Soulard Market are price
searchers without custom.

That implies they are callous toward the possibility

of becoming the regular customer of certain firms, with the trade-off of freedom
for regularity that this means. They search only for the lowest price. This may
be a reasonable simplification of shopper behavior, and is certainly supported by
vendors

1

alone.

complaints about many customers who discriminate on the basis of price
That such shoppers exist is obvious to any observer after a short while

on the market.

But it is also obvious that other shoppers have custom, and

return to the same vendors every week.
•

shopper?

How important is this latter type of

What if a significant number of shoppers trusted to their personal

relationships with specific vendors and bought items regardless of minor price
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variations as suggested by the Price variable's behavior?

In that case the

vendors' fine adjustments of factors of production would not be more important
than their maintenance of good relationships with regular customers.

That would

mean the theory of efficient economic decision making was part of a story whose
other part was a theory of custom.

This hypothesis, that custom is a potent

explainer of marketplace sales, will now be considered.
Many vendors talk about the importance of regular customers.

For example,

one vendor expressed this strategy:
I just try to deal in everything cause I try to get a whole customer.
I try to get a customer exclusive.

I want to sell him so that when he

gets done with me he's going to have everything he needs and walk away.
Then, when he comes back next week, he'll come to me.

Or, another vendor, discussing scarce items:

If bananas are high, like they were Saturday, we had four or five
boxes.

We didn t even have them on the stand, we just bought them to
1

take care of our customers.
and G.S.

\vanted one.

Like Saturday morning we had two of them

And He said, 'I can't give it to you', and he
1

said, 'I need one for an order', and I said to his son , 'J., you are
crazy if you give it to him, we only have two bananas and we need them
for our customers.' Sure, they were scarce!

Another vendor expressed both shopper strategies:

My mother has a customer who will buy everything on that stand that
they need, but most of your sales are a couple of items.

Because of
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the structure of the market, competitive.

People don t want to feel
1

like they are cheating themselves, buying everything from one stand,
and not taking advantage of the market.

Thus, competitive price comparison is only one shopper strategy, while the
other is to develop customary relationships, habitual patterns of behavior, and
to maintain person-to-person relationships to complement the person-to-thing
relationships of the marketplace.
If the considerations just discussed had merit they would be reflected in
the quantitative data on market sales.

A significant part of a firm s sales
1

would be due to a past history of personal attention to developing customary
relations with shoppers.

All vendors have been on the market for many years,

have grown up in market families, and most have taken over a parent s stand.
1

I

have no direct measures of the quality or quantity of vendor-customer relations,
so a variable reflecting vendor uniqueness will have to serve.
can be defined as a set of binary,

11

dummy

11

variables coded

11

Such a variable

1 for one unique
11

firm s weekly data and 0 for the data from a11 other firms. The total number of
11

I

11

11

firm-dummy 11 variables is one less than the number of firms in the sample (the

missing firm s data are contained in the constant term of the regression).
1

In

this case eleven firm-dummy variables were defined and regressed against gross
sales.

The regression equation is as follows:

Gross Sales

=

(D-denotes a dummy or binary, variable coded,
11

D-Firmll) + errors.

f (D-Firml, D-Firm2, D-Firm3,
11

1'1 for that firm, and

0 for all others).
11

Any factors unique to each firm which determine gross sales will contribute
to a good fit of this equation to the data.

Custom, meaning sales to regular
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customers, is assumed to be the largest of this set of unique factors.

To the

extent that such factors are important the regression will be significant.

The

results are given in Table 4, equation Dummy-1. The equation explains 68% of the
variance in the data, and nine out of the eleven firm-dummy variables are
significant (including the significance of the omitted firm-dummy means 10/ 12
are significant) at the .001 level or better. This means that merely knowing the
name of each of the 256 firm-week observations, knowing which of the twelve firms
that set of data pertains to, is sufficient to account for 68% of the variance in
the data.

Remember that the full set of variables in the economic model

explained 73% of the variance.

A difference of five percent of the variance

explained is certainly significant, but the fact that the firm-dummy variables
account for so much is striking.
explain behavior.

Certainly the purpose of the analysis is to

Insofar as the Dummy-1 regression merely labels ignorance,

Log-1 is clearly preferable.

But the results in Dummy-1 tell us more:

That

sheer custom, meaning historical presence on the marketplace, enables a firm to
capture part of the stream of demand passing in front of the stand. 13 Further,
Dummy-1 tells us that the sales by each firm each week simply do not vary very
much from '.'1eek to week.

This does not mean that firms do not vary their

allocative decisions each week.

We have seen that they do.

It means that the

variations do not kick each firm out of its relatively stable position in the
marketplace, with respect to the positions of all the other firms.
Both sets of variables, the economic model and the firm-dummies, are
combined in regression Dummy-2 in Table 4.

This last model combines MESR

economic calculation,

and strategic

through the economic

variables,

with

economic custom as represented by the firm-dummy variables. It fits the data
extremely well since an R2 of .86 is more usually found in analyses of aggregate,
not individual data.
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Only one firm-dummy variable and Stalls are not significant.

Stalls is

insignificant because stalls are rented by each firm on an annual basis, and,
although stall usage varies from week to week (as shown by the significance of
;,.

this variable in the previous regressions), once the firms themselves are in the
regression most of the effects of variations in stalls are taken up by the firmdummies. The other variables remain generally the same as before.

In particular

Price is still positive, significant, and about the same magnitude as in Log-1.
The marginal product of workers, as calculated in this regression, drops below
its level as calculated in Log-1.

A third and fourth worker here would add $22

and $16 to gross income, v,hich is less than their estimated cost.

Thus when

firm-unique factors are held constant, the vendors seem to be using too many
workers to maximize profits.

Thus the firm-dummy variables account for a significant part of the
variation in Gross Sales.

When the firm-unique factors are combined with the

economic variables, the resulting model fits the data extraordinarily well.

The

new model reveals the importance of customary economic behavior. The picture of
reality given by the preceding, purely economic model is shown to be essentially
valid, except that the lesson of the Workers variable is discounted.

This final

equation says that firms do not hire workers in a MESR calculating way, instead
they use more workers than a normative profit maximizing model would predict.

If

all workers were unrelated to firm bosses, this would mean that firms allocate
their workers inefficiently.

Since most workers are members of boss

1

families,

it suggests that income is being shared within the families that work in market
)"
firms. '
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Summary Discussion
Few studies exist which analyze economic decision making behavior in
sufficient detail to compare 1t1ith this work.

Gladwin and Gladwin (1977), C.

Gladwin (1975), and Quinn (1978) have made descriptive models of Ghanaian fish
sellers

decisions.

1

These models

are

impressive for

their ethnographic

sophistication and accuracy and influenced the parallel effort in this work.

C.

Gladwin, for example, was able to account for 85% of 100 market choices in a
flowchart which considered supply, demand, scale of activity and level of capital
investment in smoking ovens.

A full discussion of these descriptive decision

models is deferred to a later paper; comparability with the main focus of the
present study is limited because these authors did not assess productivity or
economic efficiency.
McGee s (1975) study of hawkers in Southeast Asia is full of descriptive
1

insights and valuable policy recommendations.

Similarly Geertz (1979) presents

an analysis of a Moroccan market town which is rich in cultural generalizations
and insights.

Neither of these studies are based on precise measurements of

observed individual behavior, which would allow comparison with the work.

Such

studies often assume a level of efficiency among marketplace firms which this
work has tried to measure through quantitative analysis.
Swetnam (1973) discusses the effects of very stable prices of durables such
as blankets, rope and pottery in the Antiqua, Guatemala marketplace.

He claims

these prices reflect an ol igopol i st ic, or monopolist ical ly comp et it ive market
structure 1-1hich equalizes

..

among firms.

11

marginal income1', meaning net or disposable income,

This is achieved through natural adjustments in the number of

vendors instead of through natural adjustments in the market price.

Thus the

market in Swetnam s model reacts to increases in individual firms' incomes caused
1

by greater sales (in turn due to shifts in demand interacting with stable prices)

;,
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by increases in the number of vendors who share in the total sales. When the pie
shrinks because of decreasing demand, income equality among firms is maintained
by shrinking the number of vendors.
This model of an agrarian marketplace with a free flow of vendors in and out
of trade is reminiscent of Mintz s seminal (1964) study of Haitian salt vendors,
1

who dee i ded between market retailing and begging each day depending upon the
price ratio.

Yet Swetnam s model
1

is based on a static analysis of the

The essential relation between total sales and

inventories of only three firms.

total number of vendors is not observed.
model is unclear.

Thus the empirical relevance of the

Cook (1970), for example, has demonstrated dramatic variation

in the price of stone metates over a year in a Mexican marketplace, so Swetnam s
1

claim of extreme price stability cannot be accepted on the basis of the
durability of the goods alone.

Dannhaeuser (1980) uses a similar model of

monopolistic competition, but shows price variations among neighborhood stores
in a Philippine town.

He accounts for his price variation and Swetnam s price
1

stability as due. to the economic difference between dispersed (store) and
clustered (marketplace) location.

However Cook s work, as well as the present
1

study, shows that clustering is not necessarily associated with price stability.
Metate prices varied over time, and produce prices at Soulard varied in the cross
section as well as over time.

It must be noted, in defense of Swetnam s model,
1

that market entry of 0axacan metateros and Soulard produce merchants is not
totally free, as presumed in the model.

It seems that the relation bet'tteen

freedom of market entry, price stability, and distribution of income among market
firms needs to be examined further.
The significance of the firm-dummy variables, implying that firms at Soulard
cultivate

unique

relationships with

competition exists at Soulard Market.

shoppers,

suggests

that monopolistic

The textbook definition of this is where

i,
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firms offer somewhat unique products in a market full of similar, but not
identical sellers.

The U.S. market for cars or toothpaste is an example.

Some

theorists believe prices in such markets will be slmv to change, because
increases will result in lost sales while decreases will be immediately met by
competitors, resulting in no change in market shares but losses in revenue for
all. The stable situation is found where each firm sells at a higher price and a
lower volume than would be found in perfect competition. Yet this situation does
not affect the profit-maximizing conditions for any firm, of equating marginal
cost to marginal revenue.

And insofar as consumers show brand loyalty or

economic custom, small price increases will not cause firms to lose customers.
The Price variable did become more significant when firm-unique factors were
controlled for in this analysis, meaning that higher prices did produce higher
dollar sales (J.!., and only i!_, one asumes totally homogenous goods; insofar as
higher prices reflect higher quality goods, then the Price variable implies that
consumers discriminate and value quality.

In fact, I think both things operate

on the market.)
Monopolistic competition at Soulard Market is associated with relatively
limited entry and highly variable prices. Shifts in supply and demand are common
and dramatic at Soulard, and are translated into significant variations in
income, in contrast with Swetnam' s model. For example, my rough estimates of net
incomes among market firms range from $5,000 to $35,000 for the year. Yet I note
that monopolistic competition at Soulard Market is not associated with an
absolutely high level of prices, as demonstrated
comparisons (see note 10).

by

the supermarket price

No doubt Soulard's prices would be cheaper if custom

did not exist on the market, and certainly supermarket prices reflect a vastly
larger, more complex bundle of of g,oods and services than is available at
Soulard.· Yet the fact remains that monopolistic competition at Soulard Market is
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associated with highly variable, relatively cheap prices and highly stable
firms.
Whether monopolistically competitive'1 or ''purely competitive,
11

11

marketplace
\

firms should be economically efficient.

Marketplaces give produce merchants

immediate, frequent, and concrete responses to their economic decisions.

This

represents a clear opportunity for maximally efficient short run economic
behavior.

Such a MESR firm would vary its niche by varying its staples to take

advantage of the most profitable portfolio each week.

In fact, the descriptive

model I hypothesized for their weekly economic behavior (the flowchart model)
shows that merchants avoid major decisions like the plague.

Soulard merchants

solve their 11eekly decision problem through custom and habit.

They do not act

1

like. natural micro-economists using market information to solve a profitmaximizing problem.
Regression Log-1

implies that firms

economize on the only allocative

decision they have real control over, which is the number of workers hired each
week.

This seems to ignore the kinship relations beb1een workers and bosses.

Since most (four out of five)

workers on the marketplace are

coresidents of the firms' bosses, the firm's correlation of dorkers
1

products and marginal costs may be irrelevant.

household
1

marginal

For if a worker who is also a

boss' child would receive, as allowance, the wage received on the market, then
any positive marginal product created by that worker would add to net income and
merit employment

by

the profit maximizing family firm.

If the worker is employed

basically in order to keep out of trouble, or is a future boss in training, then
even a negative marginal product may be economically rational in the long run. A
few dollars

11

lost

11

on the marginal-product-wage balance sheet may be far less

than the real costs to a parent of a child's behavioral or criminal problems.
And if the child is in training to take over the firm then some small costs in the
present may be lessons to avoid large costs in the future.
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In additional

research the Workers variable should be decomposed into

economically dependent and independent household residents, and non-residents.
Insofar as workers may not receive allowances equivalent to their marketplace
wages, or would not get into trouble off the market, or have no intention of
becoming bosses, then the normal profit maximizing equations are relevant no
matter what the kinship relations may be.

In the present case I think that few-

at most a third-of the workers 1•1ould receive a payment, smaller than their weekly
wage, even if they did not work on the market. Otherwise, based on this sample of
data and ignoring the effects of firm-unique factors, regression Log-1 tells us
that workers seem to be hired in a profit maximizing way.
When the possibility is admitted that unique attributes of each firm may
determine part of their sales (in regression Oummy-1 and Oummy-2) these factors
turn out to be highly significant.

The most likely explanation for this

significance is that a good part of each firm's sales are to regular customers
who ignore small variations in price and buy steady amounts each week.

In most

cases such customers are known to bosses, but these regu 1ar customers may be
unfamiliar to many bosses.

The shopper may not converse with salespeople, or the

boss may prefer, as many do, to trim and stock produce instead of sell to
consumers.

Thus,

while most vendors stressed the importance of regular

customers, even those who did not could have such relations.
This understanding of the importance of custom on the market clarifies the
behavior of the Price variable.

A positive value for this variable means that

each firm s sales are price-inelastic, meaning that increases in price create
1

higher gross sales.
•·

· This should not occur in a competitive marketplace of

similar firms, unless customers choose to ignore the benefits of comparison
shopping.

Thus the evidence suggests that both vendors and shoppers choose not

to use the available market information to solve a profit maximizing problem.
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Instead buyers as t1ell as sellers mix economic custom with their short run
1

calculatio'ns to achieve an acceptable deal on the market.
The ethnographic decision model and the econometric decis·ion model provide
consistent results.

The most important decisions determine a firm's niche and

are rarely examined explicitly.

Whether merchants could act like MESR firms if

they had the ability to deal in the whole range of produce; or whether they have
this ability but lack the daring to risk; or how knowledge of produce attributes
and willingness to risk interrelate in various classes of firms; and the development of a fully behavioral model of firms in marketplaces are all questions for
future research.

At present I conclude that a formal analysis of quantitative

marketplace sales data has revealed the strength of economic custom.
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NOTES

1.

I use the term public marketplace to denote a well-defined geographic space,

either enclosed or open-air, in /1/hich numerous, relatively small independent
1

firms offer products for sale.

Such marketplaces may be rural, urban, municipal

(owned by a municipality); farmers' (involving firms who nominally grow what they
sell); terminal

(associated with a railroad terminal); and,

of course, may

specialize in wholesale or retail sales.
2.

This study has been supported by the National Science Foundation (NSF SNS

780804).

The

International

Office

of

Studies,

all

contributed material help.

Research,
of

the

Graduate

School,

and

the

University of Missouri-St.

Center
Louis,

for
also

Qualitative data collection was begun in the summer

1977 by Ms. Lorraine Eckstein.

The author and Mr. Daniel Byrne joined Ms.

Eckstein from summer 1978 through summer 1979.
continued by the author through 1980.

Qualitative data collection

Quantitative data was collected by all

three fieldworkers during a period of sixty weeks from July 1978 through August
The author expresses a deep sense of gratitude to Eckstein and Byrne for

1979.

help in data collection, and to Byrne for assistance in the computer analysis of
data.

Basic issues in this research were also discussed with Hugh Gladwin and

Kenneth Shapiro, whose help is gratefully

ackno 1t✓ ledged.

Unfortunately the

faults of analysis are mine alone.
3.

The term

11

merchant 11 ,,.,ill be used to denote a vendor who sells shipped-in

produce. A "farmer 1' is a vendor v1ho sells home-grown produce, presumably but not
alivays gro'i'm by the vendor.

A few 11 merchant-farmers" specialize mainly, but not

totally in home-gro ,m produce during summer months and shift to wholesaled
1

vegetables in the winter.
4.

The distinction between niche-choices and quantity-choices parallels that

between "preattentive 11 and '1 attentive'1 decisions (H. Glad1vin & M. Murtaugh 1980)
1

and ' Stage l" and "Stage 2" decisions (C. Gladwin 1980).

i

I
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5.

This is not as simple as it sounds:

If the oranges are priced eight for a

dollar and a quarter can you quickly figure how many you 1vould sel 1 for t1>10
dollars?

Those interested in a natural science of mathematics would do well to

study market vendors.
6.

The fact that ecpnomically valuable information is being exchanged does not

dilute the real and significant pleasure those vendors who spend much time on the
market get from each other s company.
1

real dilute the competitive-market,

Neither does the fact that the pleasure is
11

buyer be1•1are1' attitude that they claim

defines the rules of the game at Produce Row.

In theory a merchant who buys

produce that he believes to be better in quality than it actually is, should have
no recourse since he could have examined every case before he bought it.

In

practice jobbers often give credit for such produce.
7.

Names of variables used in the regressions are italicized to indicate that

they represent precisely defined quantitative measures.
8.

The relation of costs to productivity determines a firms

11

allocative

efficiency, while the relation of the input variable to the output variable
determinies technical" efficiency. Thus the fact that one worker may be able to
11

sell fifty boxes of corn per day relates to technical efficiency, while the fact
· that the worker may earn in wages more or less than the markup on the corn relates
to allocative efficiency.

Jones 1977 discusses these concepts with respect to

peasant farming.
9.

It seems unlikely that most average decision makers would be able to assess

these magnitudes without professional help. Most analysts resolve this

issue by

positing an unconscious knowledge based on complete familiarity with one s
1

business, and by a natural selection in· the market (broadly defined) for
efficient

.c .
1

1

rms.

The underlying issues are very significant (Plattner 1974;

Samuelson 1965). Here I will pass over them by positing the former

11

unconscious
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knowledge position.

The firms are small enough in scale, and each boss 'Narks

directly in his location and has total knowledge of all economic activities in
his firm.

Thus the sensitivity to the marginal productivity implied here is not

so far-fetched.
10. Prices were compared for a market basket of twenty four items of fresh
produce sold in Soulard Market and in six local supermarkets. The comparison was
done in June 1978 and again in June 1979. Soulard's cost was 65% of of the chainstore's cost in the two years.

Details are given in the Market Memo (Plattner,

1979).
11. The true costs of additional stalls should include the illegal side payments
made to "purchase the stal 1 from its present owner.
approach $1,000 per stall.

These are rumored to

No stalls have changed hands recently, and no attempt

is made here to estimate the annual cost of such payments.
12. Note that the large variations around the mean values .indicates that any
conclusion with respect to the average of the sample does not hold for all the
individuals.

It merely means that vendors who use too many workers are balanced,

in the aggregate, by vendors who use too few.
13. It can also be interpreted as showing that scale is everything, and that the
market was in equilibrium during the period of the study.

Each firm occupied a

unique economic niche in the scale of marketplace niches.

But this seems merely

another way of saying that custom, as well as economic calculation, explains the
market.
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14. The precise distribution of market personnel is as follows:

Male Female
Boss

Total(Percent)

67

5

72

40

0

30

30

17

31

25

56

31

Other Relative of Boss

8

2

10

06

Unrelated

9

3

12

07

115

65

180

101

Spouse
Boss' Nuclear Family

Total

Thus eighty-eight percent of the people working on the market are bosses or
members of the boss' nuclear family.
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Figure 1. Descriptive Mode1 of Decision Making of Soulard Market Merchants.

rf)a,mt1!

}3D
/2o

Product

I lo
/CO

9o

&)

?o
{tJ

So

Lfo

3o
JD
lo

I I

.

7

g

6

7

8

22D

zo:;

Q

/go

::itf\L.L3

6

J.to
2'/0

'r)c1_;-9111 a I

roduct

5

; I'

Ito
/J-/6
/20
{00

I.

80
60
1/0

:::w
!5
1 S.D.

f<.ed - Sc! 1c! /;nc ~ 0::. ,;r;~L-:f,ic

P..,.::-

J
,\.~Ci

/,.,, .J....--;..

~

J

c.,.__, {LV

I .' .., .-'\ ,.

J.li'..--'J

I

A

' ...

J Vt;i?.

J--;.·i ::a .v11

C//;,{_:J

,

;2,{)()

1

1;.-7c/:? t·---.-.'_:{:!.1-~:l V 7 /.'t-11\ (!
Sp 1 J l
.

Figure 2.. Marginal Products of Workers and Stalls From Regression Log-1.
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Table 1:

Variable
Name
Gross Sales
Gross Income
Net or
Disposable
Workers
St a11 s
Nit ems
Temp
Price
0-Wing 1
0- 1,~i ng 2
D-1~ing 3
0-Wing 4
0-Christmas
a.
b.

MEAN VALUES FOR ALL VARIABLES (N=256)

Variable
Produce sold x price.
Gross Sales minus cost
of produce bought that
week.
Gross Income minus
workers' wages, rent,
costs of bags,
electricity, taxes.
All workers behind
stand
market stalls
Number of different
corrrnodities sold.
Temperature at noon
on market day.
Average z-scores
of item prices.
Locations in SW wing.
Locations in NW wing.
Locations in SE wing.
Locations in NE wing.
Christmas 1'Jeek

Unit
dollars

Arithmetic Standard Geomet 6ic
mean
Deviation
mean
1354
856
1065

dollars

542

404

358

do 11 ars

389

338

189

people
stalls
items of
produce
degrees
numerical
price ratio
binarya
binary
binary
binary
binary

2.1
1.8

3

19

11.3

16

61.3

19.8

57

3.9
3.7

.11

.01
.47
.34
.18
.02

3.3

.43
.09

.50
.48
.39
.15

The mean of a dummy or binary variable is that variable's proportion of
the whole sample.
Geometric means are used with logarithmic variables to calculate marginal
products.

.d
'
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Table 2:

Regressions of untransformed variables (n=256)
Dependent variable: Gross Sales
Regression
Linear-1
Variableb
Coefficient
F
3*a

l'iorkers
~/orkers 2
Stalls
St alls 2
Nitems
Nitems 2
Price
D-\-li ng 2
0-Wing 3
D-Wi~g4
Temp
0-Christmas

880
-66
51
-68

-2507

54

*Starred coefficients are not significant at the .01 level.
0- denotes a binary or dummy variable.
R2 corrected for number of regressors.
Correlation Coefficients of Selected Variables

Gross Sal es
Workers
Sta 11 s

Stalls
.50
.72

\-/orkers
.57

•9

91
40

1371

54

Nitems
.47
.74
.67

6.5
.4

777

192*
296*
.14

l

.68c

8.2

-64

103
41

F

43
29

866

4.5
0

Li near-2

12.5

271

51
36
25
12

626
-54*
309*
.14
1348

F

b.
c.

0

-21

.. 2407

a.

Regression
Coefficient

C

.65.
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Table 3:

Regressions of Logarithmically transformed variables (N=256)
Dependent Variable: Ln Gross Salesa
Regression

Log-1

Regression

Log-2

Variableb,c

Coefficient

F

Coefficient

F

Ln ~Jorkers
Ln Stalls
Ln Nitems
Price
0-\✓ i ng 2
0-Wing 3
D-Wing4
Ln Temp
D-Christmas

.21
.52
.67
.24
.17*
-.39*
.28*
.47
.68

6.5
29
74
14
.5
2.5
1.3
50
16

. 61
.68

64
40

.19

7.2
4.2
.2
2.5
34
19

c2nstant
R
F

a.
b.
c.
d.

2.30d
.73
79

Ln denotes the natural logarithm of the variable.
*Starred coefficients are not significant at the .01 level
D~ denotes a binary or dummy variable.
R corrected for number of regressors.
Correlation Coefficients of Selected Variables

Ln Gross Sales
Ln Workers
Ln Stalls

Ln Ni terns Ln Stalls Ln ~lorkers
.63
.62
.69
.75
.76
.68

.56
.13*
.44*
.43
.82
3.24d
.67
61
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Table 4:

Regressions with Firm-Dummy variables (N=256)
Dependent Variable: Ln Gross Salesa

Variableb,c

Regression

Dummy-1

Regression

Dummy-2

Coefficient

F

Coefficient

F

D-Firm 1
D-Firm 2
0-Firm 3
D-Firm 4
0-Firm 5
0-Firm 6
0-Firm 7
D-Firm 8
D-Firm 9
D-Firm 10
0-Fi rm 11
Ln Workers
Ln Stalls
Ln Ni terns
Price
Ln Temp

.7
1.4
1.6
2
1. 7
2.4
2.1

c~nstant

5.37d
.68

R
F

a.
b.
c.
d.

1. 7

153

.5*
.6*
1. 9

1.5
2
177
24
112
133

212
14
312
253

1.6
1. 3
.3*
1.5
.8
1.0
1.5
1.0
.8
1. 7
.9
.13

-.01*
.82
.55
.63
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Ln denotes the natural logarithm of a variable.
0- denotes a binary or dummy variable.
S~arred variables are not significant at the .01 level.
R corrected for number of regressors.

1.16
.86
92

248
17
.7
112
75
83
194
46

6.6
107
20 ·
3.6
.01
91
122
23

..
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